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KRONECKER IN CONTEMPORARY
MATHEMATICS
GENERAL ARITHMETIC AS A
FOUNDATIONAL PROGRAMME
A b s t r a c t. Kronecker called his programme of arithmetiza-
tion “General Arithmetic” (Allgemeine Arithmetik). In his view,
arithmetic is the building block of the whole ediﬁce of mathemat-
ics. The aim of this paper is to show that Kronecker’s arithmetical
philosophy and mathematical practice have exerted a permanent
inﬂuence on a long tradition of mathematicians from Hilbert to
Weil, Grothendieck and Langlands. The conclusion hints at a
constructivist ﬁnitist stance in contemporary mathematical logic,
especially proof theory, beyond Hilbert’s programme of ﬁnitist
foundations which can be seen as the continuation of Kronecker’s
arithmetization programme by metamathematical or logical means.
It is ﬁnally argued that the introduction of higher-degree polyno-
mials by Kronecker inspired Hilbert’s notion of functionals, which
in turn inﬂuenced Go¨del’s functional Dialectica interpretation for
his intuitionistic proof of the consistency of arithmetic.
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.1 Introduction. Arithmetical philosophy
I understand arithmetical philosophy on the model of Russell’s mathemat-
ical philosophy as an internal examination of arithmetical concepts – in
the case of Russell, the internal examination of logical and general mathe-
matical concepts (Russell [1919]). The two texts “On the concept of num-
ber” (Kronecker [1987b]) and his last lectures in Berlin “On the concept
of number in mathematics” (see the German text edited by Boniface and
Schappacher [2001]) summarize Kronecker’s conception of number or whole
number (integer). Kronecker shares with Gauss the idea that the concept of
number is in the mind or a priori while space is a property or relation in the
external world; geometry and mechanics do not belong to the realm of pure
mathematics since they have to represent and picture natural processes by
using the concept of continuity whereas number inhabits the discrete uni-
verse of ordinals. Cardinals are invariants for the counting of groups of
objects and equivalence is an intensional relation. The concrete combina-
torial procedures (Verfahren) of addition, multiplication, congruence, etc.
join with the general concepts of forms or homogeneous polynomials and
their properties in the process of arithmetization.
There is a Kantian background to Kronecker’s conception of number
and Kronecker could not help but mock the philosophy of mathematics of
post-Kantian philosophers like Schelling and Hegel1. Philosophical deﬁni-
tions of number are useless and one must start with the basic facts of a
science (arithmetic here) and then fully elaborate the conceptual determi-
nations (Begriﬀsbestimmungen) of the subject matter. In that sense, pure
mathematics was for Kronecker an experimental science in the construc-
tion of concepts in accord with Kant’s dictum “Mathematics constructs
concepts, philosophy analyzes them”. Beyond this motto, Kronecker has
hoped for a thorough arithmetization of mathematics, especially algebra;
arithmetization of algebra has been the main task of his mathematical life
as Kronecker confesses in a letter to Lipschitz ([1986] : 181-182)
On that occasion [the publication of his 1882 paper], I have
1Kronecker does not reject all of Hegel and he quotes him approvingly on certain oc-
casions, but he has not taken Hegel’s conception of number seriously. One should mention
however that contemporary mathematicians, like Lawvere in category theory, logicians
in non-standard analysis and philosophers of logic (dialetheism and paraconsistent logic)
have tried to make good of some of Hegel’s ideas.
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found the long-sought foundations of my entire theory of forms
which somehow brings to completion “the arithmetization of al-
gebra” which has been the goal of my whole mathematical life;
it is evident to me that at the same time arithmetic cannot dis-
pense with the “association of forms” and that without them,
it can only go astray in meandering thoughts (Gedankengespin-
ste) as is the case with Dedekind, where the true nature of the
matter is obscured rather than illuminated.
(my translation)
Beyond the polemical tone, one sees the central role of his 1882 formulation
and it is especially in that connection that Hermann Weyl has asserted the
superiority of Kronecker’s algorithmic approach in algebraic number theory
with his domains of rationality (Rationalita¨tsbereiche) over Dedekind’s con-
cept of ﬁeld (Ko¨rper). Association of forms means in that context homoge-
neous polynomials with integer coeﬃcients and indeterminates, the central
topic of Kronecker’s major work (1882) “Die Grundzu¨ge einer arithmetis-
chen Theorie der algebraischen Gro¨ssen” (“On the Fundamental Features
of an Arithmetical Theory of Algebraic Quantities”).
As far as analysis is concerned, Kronecker has sought arithmetical in-
variants in the theory of elliptic functions and Weil has granted him the
status of the pioneer of algebraic-arithmetic geometry. In those lectures of
1891, Kronecker comes back to the approximation method which he calls lo-
calization (Isolierung) of real roots of an algebraic equation in well-deﬁned
intervals of values for algebraic equalities and inequalities. In his criticism
of Bolzano’s theorem on intermediate values, Kronecker villiﬁes Bolzano
for having used the crudest means (mit den rohesten Mitteln) to obtain an
analytical result which cannot be applied to the roots of an entire function.
He also mentions Dirichlet’s celebrated analytical proof on the inﬁnity of
primes in any arithmetical progression which he has discussed in his Vor-
lesungen u¨ber Zahlentheorie (Kronecker [1901]). As K. Hensel puts it in the
Preface, the methods of arithmetic and algebra rest on a ﬁnite number of
steps, (eine endliche Anzahl von Versuchen), while analysis is built upon
the concepts of continuity and limit. Here Kronecker tackles Dirichlet’s
transcendental proof on the inﬁnity of primes in any arithmetical progres-
sion and introduces an arithmetical extension on a ﬁnite interval (μ... ν)
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for two integers μ, ν where one must ﬁnd at least one prime of the form
hm + r for m and r with no common divisors. Kronecker says that it is one
case among others where arithmetic can do more than analysis and go be-
yond analytical methods. Dirichlet had used inﬁnitesimal analysis (inﬁnite
series) in his proof and had confessed that what was still lacking were the
right principles or conditions under which transcendental relations between
indeterminate integers could be removed.
Kronecker deﬁnes arithmetic as pure mathematics free from space and
time (see Boniface and Shappacher [2001] : 227) and pays tribute to Gauss
for having deﬁned the true nature of arithmetic with the introduction of
the concepts of composition (and decomposition into roots) of algebraic
systems, in this case quadratic forms (ibid., 262), and he credits him also
with the introduction of the notion of indeterminates (indeterminatae). In
his opposition to the analytical concepts of continuity and limit, Kronecker
is echoing Gauss who in a 1831 letter to Schumacher did denounce the use
of completed inﬁnite quantities (vollendete unendliche Gro¨sse) with the
maxim “The inﬁnite is only a manner of speech”, (Das Unendliche ist nur
eine Fac¸on de parler). Kronecker could have made that maxim his own,
but Leibniz had already qualiﬁed those inﬁnitesimal quantities as useful
ﬁctions in the calculus. Kronecker would have been surprised though, had
he studied more seriously Hegel’s conception of the mathematical inﬁnite,
to learn that Hegel espoused the Leibnizian-Gaussian idea of a diﬀerential
calculus dealing with the relative character of quantities rather than with
the absolute limits of an inﬁnite iterative process. In any case, Kronecker’s
view of the matter is in total agreement with Gauss’ arithmetical philoso-
phy and it is no surprise this time if he has opposed Cantor’s practice of
transﬁnite arithmetic which he has discarded as mathematical sophistry.
A few important mathematicians have emphasized Kronecker’s inﬂu-
ence on contemporary mathematics : among them, ﬁrst and foremost Weil
([1976], [1979]) has stressed the fact that Kronecker is the founder of mod-
ern algebraic geometry and Edwards [1990], [1992] after Weyl [1940] has
insisted on Kronecker’s pioneering work in algebraic number theory (divisor
theory). Bishop [1970] has admitted in his work on the computational (or
numerical) content of classical analysis that his enterprise was more in line
with Kronecker than with Brouwer. Brouwer himself paid tribute to Kro-
necker – as did Poincare´ and Hadamard – for his contribution to the ﬁxed
point theorems (see Gauthier [2009]). Poincare´ for one among many others
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like Skolem or van der Waerden repeated Hensel’s catch phrase in the Pref-
ace of Kronecker [1901] “a ﬁnite number of trials” (eine endliche Anzahl
von Versuchen) to characterize Kronecker’s ﬁnitist stand; Poincare´ used the
phrase “ﬁnite number of hypotheses” (nombre ﬁni d’hypothe`ses) in his work
on the arithmetical properties of algebraic curves (Poincare´ [1951]) which
was the starting point of contemporary algebraic geometry, from Mordell
to Weil and Faltings. I want to concentrate in the following on contempo-
rary algebraic-arithmetic geometry and the two main programmes in the
ﬁeld, Langlands’ programme and Grothendieck’s programme as they are
motivated to a large extent by Weil’s own work in algebraic geometry (see
Weil [1979a]). Both programmes invoke Kronecker’s dream of youth, his
theory of forms (homogeneous polynomials) and modular systems which
consist in sums and products of polynomials in a general divisor theory
that was to become a theory of moduli spaces by successive generalisations
and enlargments. In my view, these programmes share some measure of
Kronecker’s arithmetical philosophy which sees arithmetic as the building
block of mathematics.
.2 Grothendieck’s Programme
In SGA 1, that is Se´minaire de Ge´ome´trie alge´brique du Bois-Marie of 1961,
Grothendieck [1971] starts his inquiry into what will be called Grothendieck’s
programme of the new foundation of algebraic geometry by taking a Kro-
neckerian point of view :
The present volume introduces the foundations of a theory of
the fundamental group in algebraic geometry from a “Kroneck-
erian” point of view which allows to deal on the same footing
with an algebraic variety (of current usage) and with the ring
of integers over a number ﬁeld, for example. This point of view
is best expressed in the language of schemes [. . . ].
(my translation)
The Kroneckerian point of view implies that function ﬁelds are the ana-
logue of number ﬁelds in the sense that an algebraic function ﬁeld in one
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variable over the ﬁeld of rational numbers Q is an extension of ﬁnite de-
gree of the ring of polynomials in one indeterminate Q[x]; function ﬁelds
behave in Q[x] as algebraic number ﬁelds in Z, the ring of integers, while
the ﬁeld of rational functions is the ﬁeld of quotients Q(x) of Q[x]. Kro-
necker [1883] had sketched in his paper “On the Theory of Higher-Level
Forms” (Zur Theorie der Formen ho¨herer Stufen) a notion of content or in-
clusion (Enthalten-Sein) for forms or homogeneous polynomials with sums
and products of rational functions in a domain of rationality – Rationalita¨ts-
bereich is the term used by Kronecker instead of Dedekind’s term Ko¨rper,
corps in French and ﬁeld in English (see Gauthier [2002]). The notion of
Enthalten-Sein or “being contained in” is not perfectly clear in Kronecker
[1882]. Molk [1885] and Vandiver [1936] have shown how to give a meaning
to Kronecker’s construction. Molk had insisted on the divisibility theory of
polynomials and Vandiver has exhibited an explicit construction of decom-
position or devolution (as opposed to convolution) for polynomial ideals.
I give here a brief description of Kronecker’s construction of these higher-
level forms – Kronecker’s terminology is in various contexts Stufe, Rang,
Ordnung or even Dimension. Kronecker had outlined [1882] the most gen-
eral setting for the decomposition (Zerlegung) of polynomial content. I
propose here my own interpretation in terms of the convolution (Cauchy)
product for polynomials. The general form of the convolution product of
two polynomials (forms) encloses (includes) or contains higher-order forms
and the substitution-elimination method enables one to remain within the
conﬁnes of integral forms. Let us start with the convolution or Cauchy
product of two polynomials
f · g = (∑
m
fmx
m) · (∑
n
gnx
n) = (
∑
m
∑
n
fmgnx
m+n)
with addition of their coeﬃcients m and n. In his major work, Kronecker
([1882] : 343) states that a form M is contained in another form M′ when
the coeﬃcients of the one are contained in the second. He then goes on to
formulate propositions on the equivalence of forms like :
Linear homogeneous forms that are equivalent can be trans-
formed into one another through substitution with integer co-
eﬃcients.
(Proposition X in Kronecker [1882] : 345.)
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and
Two forms are absolutely equivalent, when they contain each
other.
(Proposition X0 in Kronecker [1882] : 351.)
Kronecker states then what he calls a principal result (Hauptresultat),
Every entire algebraic form in the sense of the absolute equiv-
alence of Proposition X0 is representable as a product of irre-
ducible (prime) forms in a unique way.
(Proposition XIII0 in Kronecker [1882] : 352.)
Here Kronecker declares that this result shows that the association of entire
algebraic forms by the method of indeterminate coeﬃcients conserves the
conceptual determinations of the elementary laws (of arithmetic) in the
passage from the rational domain or the domain of entire rational functions
to the domain of algebraic functions. But Kronecker is not satisﬁed and
comes back the following year (Kronecker [1883] : 422) to the question and
introduces the product
m∑
h=0
MhU
h ·
m+1∑
i=1
Mm+2Um+1
(where M = M0,M1,M2, . . . ,Mn+1 are integral quantities of successive
domains of rationality R and the U ’s are indeterminates) which deﬁnes a
form of power r containing the product of forms
r∏
h
∑
k
M ′kVhk
which he maintains is still more general than the 1882 formulation. “To be
contained” here means only that the polynomials in the domains of ratio-
nality are included or contained in a higher rank (order) of their coeﬃcients.
A modular system will then decompose this construction into irreducible
polynomials. Hence, the notions of inclusion and of equivalence (recipro-
cal inclusion) of forms are valid generally, i.e. for both forms and divisors
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and factor decomposition is a descending technique perfectly similar to the
division algorithm for integers or the Euclidean algorithm for polynomials.
Dedekind’s Prague Theorem is in the continuity of Kronecker’s construc-
tion; it says2 that if all coeﬃcients of the product fg of two polynomials f
and g (in one indeterminate) are algebraic, then the product of any coeﬃ-
cient of f and any coeﬃcient of g is an algebraic integer.
For this unique decomposition of polynomials, descent is used to arrive
at irreducible polynomials, much in the same way as in Euclid’s proof of the
divisibility of composite numbers by primes. Now the fact (Gauss lemma)
that the product of two primitive polynomials (with the g.c.d. of their
respective coeﬃcients = 1) is primitive can also be had with inﬁnite descent
and reductio ad absurdum. From this fact combined with the fact that there
is unique decomposition into irreducible (prime) polynomials, we obtain
unique prime factorization. Kronecker’s version of unique decomposition
rests on the formula quoted above
r∏
h=1
MkUhk
and ∏
i=j+k
ci =
∑
j+k=i
ajbk
with j = (0, ..., m) and k = (0, ..., n). We shall read it in the form
– remembering that ap−1 ≡ 1(mod p) from a divisibility point of view –
m+n∏
i=1
(1 + cixi) =
m+n∑
i=0
(cix
m+n−1) =
∑
m+n=1
(ambn).
Kronecker’s generalization uses the convolution product for polynomials∑
h
MhU
h ·∑
i
Mm+iU
i−1 =
∑
k
M ′kU
k
where k = 0, 1, ...,n and the equation deﬁnes an n + 1 order system con-
taining n order forms. I would call those forms polynomial functionals;
they are the entire integer-valued functions that ﬁll up the sphere of forms
(Kronecker [1883] : 423). Here the M ’s are integral forms and the U ’s
indeterminates so that the product mentioned above
2See Kronecker ([1883] : 421). Edwards ([1990 : 2] rightly suggests that Dedekind’s
Prague Theorem – a generalization of Gauss Lemma to the algebraic case – is but a
consequence of Kronecker’s result.
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∏
h
∑
k
Mk′Uhk
is “contained” in the resulting form and the product can then be expressed
as
∑
k
M ′kU
k = (MkMm+1)
k+(MkMm+1)
k−1+(MkMm+1)k−2+...+(MkMm+1)
in the decreasing order of the rank k of the polynomial sum. This linear
combination obtained by the convolution product and the ﬁnite descent on
powers shows simply that integral rational forms generate integral algebraic
forms, i.e. algebraic integers. What we ﬁnd in the 1883 text is simply
a generalisation of Kronecker’s 1882 theory of forms which encompasses
both the theory of modular systems and the theory of polynomials. The
equivalence principle for forms stated in 1882 is valid in full generality
and the generalised notion of content or being contained in (Enthalten-
sein) shows that in the construction (Bildung) of entire or integral functions
the sphere of forms ﬁnds its fullest expression (Kronecker[1883] : 423). This
is not to say that Kronecker has fully realized his dream, only that he has
conceived of an ambitious project that could possibly be fulﬁlled by a long
list of successors.
Kronecker ([1883] : 422) refers explicitely to his 1882 text for the nar-
rower concept of content in his text. As a matter of fact, Hurwitz (see
[1895], vol. 2 : 198-207) obtained a proof of Kronecker’s theorem by us-
ing Lagrange’s interpolation (rather than Cauchy’s convolution product)
and the Euclidean algorithm which is also the original form of the descent
method – Hurwitz speaks of the elimination of composite powers. Here
again the ring of polynomials is the proper arena (with the largest area!)
for Kronecker’s general arithmetic of forms and their divisors. It is at
this point that Dieudonne´ ([1974], vol.1 : 200) speaks of Kronecker’s old
dream (vieux reˆve) as being realized by Grothendieck’s notion of scheme
(sche´ma). It is of course Kronecker’s Jugendtraum that Dieudonne´ evokes
here and he describes Kronecker’s ambitious project as encompassing both
number theory and algebraic geometry in the polynomial theory of mod-
ular systems (see Dieudonne´ [1974] : vol. 1, 59-61). Kronecker’s forms
or homogeneous polynomials become algebraic varieties and his notion of
level (Stufe) means dimension or codimension in algebraic geometry – Kro-
necker’s dream of youth in that context is translated into Hilbert’s 12th
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problem on the extension of Kronecker’s proposition on Abelian ﬁelds in
an arbitrary algebraic domain of rationality.
The decomposition process or division algorithm is thus a descent to
irreducible (linear) polynomials and Kronecker ([1884] : 336) in a later
paper “On Some Uses of Modular Systems in Elementary Algebraic Ques-
tions” (U¨ber einige Anwendungen der Modulsysteme auf elementare alge-
braische Fragen) makes it clear that his theory of higher forms or modular
systems makes it unnecessary to have recourse to inﬁnite series as in for-
mal power series and that ﬁnite series, that is polynomials, suﬃce or are up
to the task of extracting the arithmetic-algebraic content of general arith-
metic, as Kronecker says. The content in question amounts to substructures
and extensions in model-theoretic terms and the function ﬁeld appears then
naturally as an extension of the number ﬁeld, but Kronecker’s way was algo-
rithmic in the combinatorial build-up of the hierarchy of forms. As Edwards
points out in his Divisor Theory [1990], such extensions of ﬁnite degree are
not couched in an algebraic closed ﬁeld in modern usage and Kronecker
avoids the transﬁnite setting by simply introducing new algebraic numbers
to Q in a ﬁnite process of adjunction (see Gauthier [2002] : chap. 4 for
details). Weil has insisted on the deep connection between function ﬁelds
and number ﬁelds without avoiding entirely the transﬁnite construction and
Grothendieck in his pursuit of Weil’s conjectures has enlarged the geomet-
ric landscape with his notion of scheme. What we call today an algebraic
variety was essentially a divisor sytem or a modular system (Modulsystem)
for the polynomial ring in the hands of Kronecker; when it changes hands it
becomes a locally ringed space in the functorial category-theoretic style of
Grothendieck. Here functors transport arrows (functions) and their objects
by making room for the larger topological or toposical (topos-theoretic)
structures. I would call this approach structuralist as it is in line with the
Bourbaki School to contrast it with the constructivist approach of Kroneck-
erian ascent and one could consider algebraic geometry a` la Grothendieck
as a tension between two mother-structures, algebraic structures and topo-
logical structures, as deﬁned by Bourbaki. Grothendieck [1961] in any case
refers indiﬀerently to descent techniques or construction techniques in his
1958-1961 expose´s in the Bourbaki Seminar. Algebraic geometry could be
seen more accurately as pulled between a purely arithmetical internal logic
and an external geometrical logic. I would put Langlands’ programme more
on the side of arithmetic geometry with Grothendieck’s programme on the
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other, geometric side of algebraic geometry. In Langlands’ case as we shall
see, the “principle of functoriality” puts the emphasis on the correspon-
dence between arithmetic objects and analytic data while for Grothendieck
the question is : is algebraic geometry more algebraic than geometric? For
example in Grothendieck’s theory of motives (motifs), correspondences are
sought between arithmetic objects and algebraic-geometric structures. One
answer could be found, I believe, in the massive work of Jacob Lurie on
Higher Topos Theory [2009]. Lurie’s work is certainly of Grothendieck’s
lineage and I would like to concentrate my short analysis of the matter in
the chapter “Descent versus Hyperdescent” of Lurie’s treatise.
.3 Descent
Descent is a central topic in algebraic geometry. It is of course of arithmetic
inspiration having its origin in Fermat’s notion of inﬁnite or indeﬁnite de-
scent. It has been practised in number theory by Fermat, Euler, Gauss,
Lagrange, Legendre, Dirichlet, Kummer and Kronecker (see [1901]) and
in modern times by Hilbert, Poincare´, Mordell, Weil, Faltings, Serre and
many others. Since I have explored inﬁnite descent extensively elsewhere
(see Gauthier [2002] and [2010]), I shall simply quote Andre´ Weil’s version
:
Inﬁnite descent a` la Fermat depends ordinarily upon no more
than the following simple observation : if the product αβ of two
ordinary integers (resp. two integers in an algebraic number-
ﬁeld) is equal to an m-th power, and if the g.c.d. of α and β
can take its values only in a given ﬁnite set of integers (resp. of
ideals), then both α and β are m-th powers, up to factors which
take their values only in some assignable ﬁnite set. For ordi-
nary integers this is obvious; it is so for algebraic number-ﬁelds
provided one takes for granted the ﬁniteness of the number of
ideal-classes and Dirichlet’s theorem about units. In the case of
a quadratic number-ﬁeld Q(
√
N), this can be replaced by equiv-
alent statements about binary quadratic forms of discriminant
N.
(see Weil [1983] : 335-336)
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For algebraic number theory, descent in Weil’s sense boils down via a
height function on integers m ≥ 2 to the ﬁnite quotient group A/mA of
rational points of an Abelian group A, which is then said to be ﬁnitely
generated: this is the starting point of Galois cohomology inaugurated by
Weil. I would designate this form of inﬁnite descent as a general Euclidean
algorithm for divisor theory and Kronecker [1882] has used it accordingly
in his theory of modular systems where we have an extensive treatment
of the elimination or decomposition of forms into irreducible factors. For
model theory, Tarski’s theory of quantiﬁer elimination has its source in
Kronecker’s elimination theory following van den Dries [1988]. For algebraic
geometry (and Galois cohomology), it should be noted that Kronecker had
deﬁned a generalized Galois principle which consists essentially to move
from the group of substitutions for algebraic equations to the permutation
group of a higher invariant theory, that is for entire functions with integer
coeﬃcients and n indeterminates (see Kronecker [1882] : chap. 11, 284-285)
: these are the forms for which Kronecker claims that it is the most complete
arithmetical theory of algebraic quantities (ibid, 377). His principal result
quoted above, as Kronecker emphasizes, is the analogue of the fundamental
theorem of arithmetic for algebraic forms :
Any entire algebraic form is representable as a product of irre-
ducible (prime) forms in a canonical way.
(my translation of [1882] : 352)
This amounts in contemporary elementary algebra to the fact that the
domain F [x] of polynomials is a principal ideal domain, a major ingredient
of divisor theory. The Noetherian chain condition on ideals is ascending and
descending on the ﬁeld of F (x) of rational functions. The direct method
of calculating the g.c.d. here is the Euclidean algorithm or in the more
general algebraic-geometric situations, the descent method a` la Fermat
described by Weil above and which I have characterized as a generalized
Euclidean algorithm. This is one of the junction points between number
theory and algebraic geometry that Weil [1979b] has stressed and it is here
that Weil and Grothendieck would agree, despite Weil’s reluctance to admit
the category-theoretical language. Even the recalcitrant Dieudonne´ who
didn’t have much taste for constructive mathematics had recognized that
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Grothendieck’s notion of scheme was genetically linked to theModulsysteme
or modular systems of Kronecker.
If classical inﬁnite descent relied on the well-ordering of the natural
numbers to prove impossibility results by reductio ad absurdum for exam-
ple, it consisted also in reduction procedures for Diophantine equations of
ﬁnite degree with possibly inﬁnite solutions, a kind of positive descent. It
is also a kind of positive descent that Weil deﬁnes and Serre as well as
Grothendieck have named that descent “descending induction” or “recur-
rent induction”– Poincare´ preferred the term “re´currence” to “induction”.
It is Weil again who has introduced the practice of inﬁnite descent for ﬁeld
extensions in the theory of Galois cohomology. Cohomology as the com-
putational dual of homology harbours various devices and descent appears
under many disguises such as exact sequences, descending sequences, re-
currence hypothesis, ﬁniteness conditions, etc. Noetherian rings and spaces
have an intrinsic descent (chain) condition. Grothendieck has even invented
the term “de´vissage” to express the unscrewing of the sequence of integers
inherent to the descent method. But in his categorical idiom, descent con-
sists in representing the algebraic structures – on a Noetherian frame most
of the time – in the geometric universe or universes by arrows pointing
to the objects of the ground level (the discrete topology), thus collecting
the descent data from above and glueing them below. This is more or less
a pictorial or intuitive approach, as Giraud [1964] admits in his treatise
on Grothendieck’s theory of descent. For a recent example of the use of
descending induction in a somewhat more constructive style, one should
consult Serre’s paper [2009] “How to use ﬁnite ﬁelds for problems concern-
ing inﬁnite ﬁelds”, a most elegant illustration of a simple descent technique.
For an another illustration, Faltings had built his proof of the Mordell con-
jecture – on the ﬁnite number of rational points of a rational algebraic
curve (of genus greater than one) – on moduli spaces which are geometric
spaces endowed with a Noetherian algebraic structure and ﬁnite coverings
(see Faltings [1984]). The method of descent still works by climbing down
the ladder of natural numbers from a given n or the sparser rungs of the
prime numbers from a given p or l (for l -cohomology). The same is true
for the ring of integers and the ring of polynomials which are Noetherian,
as are ﬁnite ﬁelds. Geometric descent with functors and morphisms must
count on the algebraic-arithmetic descent to recover the ground ﬁeld or
the polynomial ring which is the fundamental arena of algebraic geometry.
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A nice illustration of this fact can be found in Jacob Lurie’s voluminous
Higher Topos Theory.
Inﬁnite categories or inﬁnity-categories (∞-categories or ω-categories)
along with n-categories are new objects of higher category theory and topos
theory. For brevity’s sake, let us say that n-categories for n ﬁnite become
inﬁnite when n = ∞. The same holds for topoi and Grothendieck descent
applies to n-topoi, where it is the usual descent a` la Fermat as introduced
by Weil. Recall that Serre deﬁnes “descending induction” as acting on two
( positive ) integers m and N with m > N descending to m = N (see [2009]
:10). What happens in the case of inﬁnite topoi above and beyond coho-
mology and cobordism for inﬁnite categories? The situation becomes more
complicated with hyperdescent, as Lurie admits ([2009] : 67) and one has to
introduce the set-theoretic machinery of transﬁnite iteration (induction) on
limit ordinals that reside in the universe of a regular uncountable cardinal;
descent consists then in a transﬁnite sequence of downward-closed subsets
(ibid., p. 800) in order to decompose them into pieces before glueing them
in a suitable topological space. In the same Grothendieck’s lineage or line
of thought, V. Voevodsky [2010] is proposing geometric (non set-theoretic)
univalent foundations for homotopy types – with equivalence classes of con-
tinuous maps between topological spaces – for an axiomatization in a de-
pendent type system a` la Martin-Lo¨f (intuitionnistic type theory). But he
needs, as he says “at least one unreacheable cardinal α” (ibid., p. 5), which
means that one has to climb the cumulative hierarchy of axiomatic set the-
ory ZFC up to an inaccessible cardinal before redescending to a topological
space or to its fundamental groupoid – groupoids are a generalization of
the notion of group and they construct all morphisms as isomorphisms in
category theory by having a partial function instead of a binary operation
between group elements or objects. Here univalent logico-geometrical foun-
dations might be seen as multivalent transﬁnite arithmetical foundations!
It is true that Grothendieck didn’t care much about the cardinality of the
universes of his U-topoi, the totality of which could be called Utopia from a
ﬁnitist point of view! But here we are a far cry from the Kroneckerian point
of departure of SGA 1, to say the least. The set-theoretic background (the
category of sets) – as a matter of fact the category of sets is reducible to a
point in topoi theory and contractible to a point in homotopy type theory –
is the starting point of category theory and topos theory, but the algebraic
side of algebraic geometry ﬁnds its basic objects in simplicial sets, that is
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ﬁnite series of ordinals. Here, I would put Quillen’s original work in ho-
motopical algebra with the Quillen-Sullivan rational homotopy theory and
Joyal’s work on quasi-categories in the algebraic trend, while the geometric
side exploits the ground territory of (homogeneous) topological spaces with
the full resources of higher set theory. Of course, one could accept the log-
ical, classical equivalence of arithmetic descent with transﬁnite induction,
but from a constructivist point of view, it can be shown that the equiv-
alence does not hold since it involves the excluded middle principle via a
double negation over an inﬁnite set of natural numbers (see Appendix 1 “La
descente inﬁnie, l’induction transﬁnie et le tiers exclu” of Gauthier [2010]
: 133-151, and also Gauthier [2002]: 51). Let us note that higher topoi
theory, not unlike ordinary (lower) topoi theory, makes room for Heyting
topoi where a second-order intuitionistic logic leaves no place for the classi-
cal excluded middle principle. The arithmetic scope of arithmetic-algebraic
geometry appears to be more faithful to its Kroneckerian inspiration and I
want to look brieﬂy at Langlands programme in that perspective.
.4 Langlands’ Programme
In his paper on contemporary problems with origins in Kronecker’s Jugend-
traum Langlands [1976] evokes Hibert’s 12th problem in the 1900 list which
reads “Extension of Kronecker’s proposition on Abelian ﬁelds over an arbi-
trary algebraic domain of rationality”. Hilbert declares that it is one of the
deepest and far-reaching problems of number theory and function theory to
generalize Kronecker’s proposition on the generation of every commutative
(Abelian) rational ﬁeld through the decomposition of ﬁelds for the roots of
unity; the idea here is to extend the rational ﬁeld to any algebraic num-
ber ﬁeld – what is called today the Kronecker-Weber theorem asserts that
any Abelian extension of Q belongs to the cyclotomic ﬁeld Q(ζm). Hilbert
holds the problem to be at the internal junction of number theory, algebra
and the theory of functions (analysis). Such a language recalls Kronecker’s
statement in his inaugural speech at the Berlin Academy of Science in the
year 1861 (see Kronecker [1968], vol. V : 388) :
[. . . ] the study of complex multiplication of elliptic functions
leading to works the object of which can be characterized as
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being drawn from analysis, motivated by algebra and driven by
number theory.
(my translation)
Kronecker was perfectly aware of the centrality of his programme which
he sees in the continuity of Gauss and Dirichlet and there is no doubt that
he hoped for a full arithmetization of analysis. The dream of his youth
(Jugendtraum) was that vision of an arithmetical theory of elliptic func-
tions, an arithmetic of ellipotomy or divison of the ellipse, as I venture to
say in analogy with the notion of cyclotomy. In a letter to Dedekind, Kro-
necker goes even as far as to say that the fundamental relation he has found
between arithmetic and analysis originates in a philosophical intuition (see
Kronecker [1899], vol. V : 453). Kronecker’s foundational insight is given its
fullest expression in his main paper on the arithmetical theory of algebraic
quantities of 1882 where he gives the ﬁnal formulation of his Allgemeine
Arithmetik or General Arithmetic. It contains, in Kronecker’s words, the
complete development of the theory of entire (rational and algebraic) func-
tions of a variable together with the systems of divisors. In such a complete
theory, the association of forms allows for the conservation of the laws of
factorization, so that the passage from natural and rational domains to
the more general algebraic domains (of algebraic integers) is perfectly uni-
form. The conservative extension of arithmetic up to the highest reaches
of algebra – the theory of entire rational and algebraic functions – is the
ultimate goal of general arithmetic deﬁned as the theory of all forms, ho-
mogeneous polynomials with integer coeﬃcients and an arbitrary number
of indeterminates.
Langlands insists also on number theory in connection with algebraic
geometry, as Weil has taught. Here Langlands points to the continuation
of Kronecker’s work on Abelian extensions by the generalization to Abelian
varieties in the hands of a long oﬀspring of number theorists from Hilbert to
Shimura and Deligne. For example, Shimura varieties embody some ideas
of Kronecker who sought arithmetic objects within the analytic core of el-
liptic functions. Abelian varieties are nowadays spread out over algebraic
number ﬁelds, ﬁnite ﬁelds, local ﬁelds and extend to contemporary arith-
metic algebraic geometry in the work of Faltings and Wiles – by the way,
descent is still present in the proof of Fermat’s last theorem, if it is only by
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the Noetherian ring on the sequence of primes, modular and automorphic
forms being on their side generalizations of Kronecker’s modular sytems.
Langlands’ programme or Langlands’ philosophy, as it has come to be
known, could be seen as a contemporary revival of Kronecker’s idea of
the deep analogy or correspondence between number ﬁelds and function
ﬁelds. Evidently, as I mentioned above, the contemporay mathematician
will not refrain from transcendental methods, but when he comes down
to the arithmetic level, he sticks as the typical arithmetician would say,
to the motto “denumerable at inﬁnity”, which means that denumerable
inﬁnity is seen as a limit or that the non-denumerable is unknown territory
(terra incognita). Langlands’ philosophy has met with success in two recent
instances, Laﬀorgue’s and Ngoˆ’s contributions to Langlands’ programme. I
want to deal brieﬂy with Laurent Laﬀorgue’s result.
Laﬀorgue [2002] has succeeded in showing the exact Langlands’ corre-
spondence between pieces of the modular space (or algebraic variety) and
its (denumerable) rational points with the help of an iteration technique
on Drinfel’d chtoukas – chtoukas comes from the Russian штука and is
drawn from the German Stu¨cke, meaning pieces. The ground ﬁeld of Lang-
lands’ correspondence is a ﬁnite ﬁeld F with a Galois group G and we
come back to the priviledged arena of applications for Fermat’s descent on
Weil’s conception. I’ll not pursue that theme, but only recall that Drin-
fel’d himself has drawn on some motives from Kronecker : his chtoukas are
elliptic modules and have an ancestral relationship to Kronecker’s search
for arithmetic objects or “discrete pieces” in the complex multiplication of
elliptic functions.
Kronecker’s dream and programme of a general arithmetic have pro-
vided a fertile soil for large-scale foundational projects, if only as deep-
seated motivations or inspirational ideas. The immediate and long-term
posterity of Kronecker’s programme includes a vast number of people from
Hurwitz and Hensel to Weil and Langlands – see the overview of the sec-
ondary literature by Marion [1995]. One should include in the list Brouwer,
Poincare´ and the French semi-intuitionists like Borel and Lebesgue to a cer-
tain extent and even Hadamard, who did borrow from Kronecker’s arith-
metical theory of functions for the particular purposes of topology e.g. the
winding number (Windungszahl) which is an integer or index giving the
number of times a closed curve c passes around a designated point P in
the plane or in contemporary idiom the topological degree for a continuous
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function to itself on the closed unit ball Dn. Russian constructivists like
Markov, Shanin, Kolmogorov up to Essenine-Volpin have also some share
of Kronecker’s ﬁnitism. But it is certainly in algebraic geometry that Kro-
necker’s heritage is most strongly felt. Weil [1976] considers Kronecker as
the originator of modern algebraic (arithmetic) geometry in the sense that
Kronecker has initiated the work on the arithmetic of elliptic functions –
they have become the elliptic curves or the modular forms of the contempo-
rary scene. Elliptic curves even play a role in recent cryptography, for they
have an arithmetical content hidden under their surface of intersection!
.5 Kronecker’s and Hilbert’s programmes in contemporary
mathematical logic
I see Hilbert’s metamathematical programme as the continuation of Kro-
necker’s arithmetical programme with other means, that is the means of
logic. In turn, I consider Hilbert’s theory of formal systems and axioma-
tization as the initiation of the arithmetization of logic after Kronecker’s
arithmetization programme. Such an arithmetization of logic is manifest
in contemporary theoretical computer science and in applied proof theory.
I want to emphasize the new developments in Hilbert’s proof-theoretical
programme.
It is common knowledge that metamathematics or proof theory is con-
cerned with ﬁnitary methods, as in Hilbert’s conception of the theory of
formal systems. I contend (see Gauthier [1989], [1991], [1994], [2002]) that
the consistency question is the crux of the matter and that it requires a ﬁnis-
tist approach in the sense of Kronecker, as some Hilbert’s early manuscripts
seem to attest – see Hallett [1995] and also Sieg [1999] for Hilbert’s later
papers. The rather sketchy attempt on the simultaneous foundation of
logic and arithmetic (Hilbert [1905]) puts forward the concept of homo-
geneous equations in a manner reminiscent of Kronecker’s combinatorial
theory of homogeneous polynomials. Consistency, following Hilbert boils
down to the homogeneous equation a = a or inequation a 
= a. In his report
on Hilbert’s research on the foundations of arithmetic, Bernays says that
Hilbert, in spite of his durable opposition to Kronecker whom he accused
of dogmatism, has wanted a reconciliation with Kronecker’s ﬁnitist stand :
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Kronecker has elaborated a clear conception which he has put
to use in many cases and his conception accords essentially with
our ﬁnitist position
(see Hilbert[1935] : vol. III : 203, my translation).
The quotation refers to Hilbert [1930] on the foundations of elementary
number theory and is a sequel to Hilbert’s paper “U¨ber das Unendliche” [1926].
The ﬁnitist position in question is the metamathematical idea of proof the-
ory which I would formulate in the following way : To use ﬁnite logical
rules with transﬁnite axioms in order to extend the ﬁnite into the inﬁnite.
The metamathematical conception is modeled after Kronecker’s extension
of elementary arithmetic into general arithmetic, an extension which should
preserve the conceptual determinations of elementary arithmetic, following
Kronecker; for Hilbert, the objective was to preserve the laws of ﬁnite logic
with the excluded middle principle in the transﬁnite (set-theoretic) realm
of ideal elements (ideale Elemente) for which classical (Aristotelian) logic
could not make place because it did not distinguish between the ﬁnite and
the transﬁnite — Kronecker could respond to Hilbert here by saying that
there was no actual inﬁnite in Aristotelian logic either, but only a potential
inﬁnite for Aristotle and Euclid. Logic will provide the passage from the
ﬁnite to the inﬁnite, since there is no place for the inﬁnite (Hilbert [1930]
: 487) as it was also proclaimed in the lecture “On the Inﬁnite”. From my
point of view, Hilbert’s metamathematical programme is but the continu-
ation or the consequence of Kronecker’s arithmetization programme.
A further proof of Kronecker’s inspiration, if not direct inﬂuence, on
Hilbert’s proof theory is the introduction by Hilbert of the ﬁnite-type func-
tionals in his (unsuccessful) attempt to prove Cantor’s continuum hypothe-
sis in his 1926 paper “On the Inﬁnite” (see Hilbert [1926]). As Kohlenbach
notes [2008] those ﬁnite-type functionals were used by Go¨del [1958] in his
Dialectica interpretation for the consistency of intuitionistic arithmetic and
it is an essential tool (with Herbrand’s theorem) for applied proof theory
(see Gauthier [2009]); it must be added here that Go¨del had already referred
to Hilbert’s construction in his 1931 paper on completeness and consistency
(cf. U¨ber Vollsta¨ndigkeit und Widerspruchsfreiheit. Ergebnisse eines math-
ematischen Kolloquiums 3 (1932): 13) where he imagines a transﬁnite se-
quence of formal systems of higher type. Let us remark though that in his
56 YVON GAUTHIER
proof for the consistency of intuitionnistic arithmetic (the Dialectica inter-
pretation), Go¨del limits his (impredicative) construction to all ﬁnite types
up to ω. Hilbert’s idea was to introduce number-theoretic functions “as
those functions of an integral argument whose values are also integers” and
then add up functions of functions, functions of functions of functions in a
ﬁnite procedure for the iteration of types of functional variables over primi-
tive integral types. Those higher-type functionals according to their height
are associated with propositions that are supposed to come into a one-to-
one correspondence with the transﬁnite ordinals up to the 0 of Cantor’s
second number class. Hilbert needed transﬁnite induction here, but since
only a ﬁnite iteration was necessary for the build-up of the functional hier-
archy, the methods of substitution and recursion would suﬃce to produce
a ﬁnitary proof, because subtitution and recursion are counted as ﬁnitary
procedures according to Hilbert. Hilbert’s course, I forcibly suggest, fol-
lows up or reproduces Kronecker’s construction of higher-level (Stufe) or
(Rang) forms or homogeneous polynomials in his 1883 paper (Kronecker
[1883]) where substitution and decomposition – or descent for recursion –
were used in a radical ﬁnitist setting, as I have shown above. Kronecker’s
idea was to build a ﬁnite hierarchy of (polynomial) functions to encompass
the content of general arithmetic, what he calls the multilevel extension
domain of arithmetic (stufenweise Gebietserweiterung der Arithmetik) in
the footsteps of Gauss (Kronecker [1882]: 356). Beyond and above this –
and despite his repeated ﬁnitist commitment (ﬁnite Einstellung) – Hilbert
wanted to include Cantor’s transﬁnite arithmetic (up to 0).
lim
n→ω ω
ω .
. .
ω}
n
= 0.
One step further and the ordinal rank structure of von Neumann or the
cumulative rank structure of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory would look like
transcendental extensions of Kronecker’s ﬁnite arithmetical rank construc-
tion! Indeed, Hilbert followed faithfully the Kroneckerian construction I
have outlined above in using the two fundamental procedures of substitu-
tion (for new variables) and recursion (Rekursion) where the values of a
function of height n+1 are derived from the values of a function of height n
(Hilbert [1926] : 184). Kronecker had instead polynomials of order n gen-
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erating a system of order n+1 by the product operation (Kronecker [1883]
: 419).
Hilbert’s attempt failed, but the construction was pursued by Hilbert’s
followers like Gentzen, Ackermann, Kalma´r – with the inﬁnite descent idea
– and Go¨del in allegedly extended ﬁnitist ways – see my critique in Gauthier
[2002 : 57-58] where I insist that tranﬁnite induction with an (excluding
third) double negation on the inﬁnite set of natural numbers cannot be
identiﬁed with inﬁnite descent from a constructive ﬁnitist point of view.
Go¨del did not use transﬁnite induction in his Dialectica interpretation, but
induction on all ﬁnite types and I contend that the functional interpretation
has a natural translation in the polynomial arithmetic of Kronecker’s theory
of higher-level forms (see Gauthier 2002: 74-76).
There is no doubt that Hilbert followed Kronecker’s steps in mathemat-
ics, for instance in algebraic invariant theory (Hilbert [1890] and Hilbert
[1893], see also Gauthier [1995]). From my point of view, Hilbert was deeply
inﬂuenced by Kronecker’s mathematical practice and in spite of his reac-
tion to Kronecker’s prohibition of transﬁnite methods (Hilbert [1926]), he
could not depart entirely from a ﬁnitist pragmatic and philosophical point
of view as far as mathematics is concerned (and logic for that matter). It is
only in 1917 that Hilbert resumed his foundational research and returned to
ﬁnitism, not without polemizing with Kronecker (posthumously!), Brouwer
and Weyl whom he considers as Kronecker’s direct heirs – for the variety of
Hilbert’s programmatic ideas, see Sieg [1999]. The simultaneous foundation
of logic and arithmetic still dominates his preoccupations and the recourse
to the notion of formal system is meant as a mechanism (a ﬁnite algorithm)
for the introduction of ideal elements. My hypothesis is that this process
mimicks Kronecker’s association of forms in his general arithmetic and the
consistency which is required for the association of ideal elements can only
be achieved by a formalism which is the exact counterpart of an arith-
metic (polynomial) algorithm, e.g. the method of descent as a generalized
Euclidean algorithm.
The propositions of general arithmetic that are found in Kronecker’s
1882 paper on the arithmetical theory of algebraic quantities can be con-
sidered as so many axioms from which Kronecker derived his results with
arithmetical means alone. In his paper on the axiomatic method ([1935],
vol. III : 146-156), Hilbert pinpoints the properties of independence and
consistency as the main features of the axiomatic method. Relative consis-
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tency of geometry and other scientiﬁc disciplines, Hilbert suggests, is based
on the consistency of arithmetic, but there is no further foundation for
arithmetic and, Hilbert adds, set theory. Logic is the ultimate foundation
and it must also be axiomatized; in the ﬁnal analysis there only remains for
the axiomatic method the question of decidability which must be settled
“in a ﬁnite number of operations” (see [Hilbert 1935], vol. III : 155). Here
Hilbert gives the example of the theory of algebraic invariants for which
he had provided a ﬁniteness proof inspired by the very method he had
used in his major result : Hilbert’s ﬁnite basis theorem depends heavily on
Kronecker’s own methods in general arithmetic and becomes the paradigm
case for the decidability property of a logical system! But there is no logic
involved in Hilbert’s result and his paradigmatic case is drawn from poly-
nomial arithmetic (Kronecker’s general arithmetic of forms). Decidability
implies, of course, that we have an algorithm or a ﬁnite procedure to decide
of a given question in a “ﬁnite number of steps”. We then come back to our
point of departure and it is not surprising to see that most decidable theo-
ries are elementary (ﬁrst-order) algebraic theories and have ended up as the
subject matter of model theory, not proof theory. The method of quantiﬁer
elimination, for instance, is a test for decidability and has been employed
by Tarski in his well-known model-theoretic results; van den Dries [1988]
has stressed the inﬂuence of Kronecker’s methods in that context. But then
what is the logical point of the decision method? A decidable theory, if con-
sistent, is ﬁnitely so. In the speciﬁc case elementary theories, logic does not
play any special role since the equational calculus of polynomials does not
need other operations than the purely arithmetical (combinatorial) laws.
The case for logic rests solely on the alleged conservative extensions of
arithmetic into the transﬁnite domain of ideal elements. I have discussed
extensively elsewhere (Gauthier [2002]) the relevance of Hilbert’s proposal
for such a “transﬁnite logic ”. It remains though that even if Hilbert had
hoped for a logical introduction of ideal elements, he has constantly stressed
that a ﬁnite process (or procedure) is the inference engine of internal con-
sistency (inhaltliches Schliessen).
Internal consistency is obtained by internal means in the case of gen-
eral arithmetic as in the case mentioned above of the theory of algebraic
invariants. Hilbert was not mistaken there and he saw consistency as inter-
nal to the polynomial equation calculus when he deﬁned consistency as the
equation a = a and inconsistency as a 
= a. We have observed that one of
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the essential tools of consistency for Kronecker’s general arithmetic is the
convolution product which generates linear polynomial expressions from
higher-level polynomial expressions as in Kronecker’s result, Dedekind’s
Prague theorem or Hilbert’s work in invariant theory. The convolution or
Cauchy product can be called Cauchy diagonal. A serious blow to Hilbert’s
programme was administered from the outside, the “external ” Cantor di-
agonal in Go¨del’s results. Of course, if Go¨del’s ﬁrst incompleteness result
assumed ω-consistency, the second incompleteness result resting on external
consistency could only be obtained from a transcendent point of view, as he
says, but Go¨del didn’t exclude the possibility of an internal (innere) con-
sistency proof (see Gauthier [2007] and [2011]). It is not only set-theoretic
arithmetic, as Hilbert himself has named it, but also set theory (including
analysis) that he wanted to secure. It is a paradoxical situation for the lo-
gician Hilbert to see his full-blown programme for consistency of set theory
and analysis put in jeopardy by a set-theoretic device! In any case, Hilbert’s
programme can still be saved to a large extent and to a larger extent than
expected if we rethink it in the framework of Kronecker’s programme. Her-
brand (see [1968] : 152), a follower of Hilbert, wanted also a consistency
proof for arithmetic and he had formulated what I call Herbrand conjecture
(see Gauthier [1983]) :
Transcendental methods cannot demonstrate theorems in arith-
metic that could not be demonstrated by arithmetical means
alone.
(my tranlation)
Herbrand stated his conjecture for a suitable formal system which he does
not describe. Herbrand was also a practitioner of (algebraic) number theory
and he expressed himself in Kroneckerian terms when he used what he called
“intuitionistic” arguments where one supposes that an object, logical or
mathematical, does not exist without the means to construct it. In the
same line of thought, he defends the potential inﬁnite for his notion of
inﬁnite domain (champ inﬁni) by saying that it is built iteratively (pas-a`-
pas) or (Schritt zu Schritt) in Kroneckerian terms, an expression also used
by Skolem. Herbrand worked for instance on ﬁnite extensions of inﬁnite
ﬁelds in the tradition of Hilbert and Kronecker, foreshadowing to some
extent the contemporary work of Weil and Serre.
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.6 Conclusion. Finitism and Arithmetism.
 Arithmetism  is the name I give to a foundational option in radical op-
position to logicism and to Frege’s question ([1893] : X) : “How far can one
go in arithmetic solely by deductive (logical) means ?” (Wie weit man in
der Arithmetik durch Schlu¨sse allein gelangen ko¨nnte? ), the arithmetician
Kronecker would respond : “How far can one go in mathematics with arith-
metic alone?” and Hilbert following suit as a logician would ask : “How far
can we go into the tranﬁnite using only ﬁnite logical means?”. One must ad-
mit that after the demise of the logicist programme (Frege and Russell) and
despite the eﬀorts of philosophers and logicians to recover Frege’s logicist
foundations of arithmetic with the second-order Hume principle, it is Kro-
necker’s arithmetist programme which is still alive in the farthest reaches of
contemporary mathematics, arithmetic-algebraic geometry. That does not
mean however that mathematicians inspired by Kronecker from Hilbert to
Weil adhere wholly to the Kroneckerian doctrine of ﬁnitism. On the con-
trary, most would allow for methods that leave Kronecker’s arithmetical
safe haven and venture into transarithmetical (set-theoretic), geometrical
or analytical (trancendental) extended universes. A good pilot here is cer-
tainly Hilbert himself.
Hilbert introduced ideal elements (ideale Elemente) in order to have a
clear-cut divide between the ﬁnite and the non-ﬁnite, a divide that Aris-
totelian logic did oversee, because it could not survey – (Unu¨bersichtlichkeit)
in Hilbert’s text [1926] – the extent of its applications. The idea of the
epsilon-calculus for the -symbol was to enable the extension of the sim-
ple laws of Aristotelian logic, excluded middle and universal instantiation
with existential import, to the transﬁnite universe of ideal statements.
Once this is achieved, one could redescend in the ﬁnite by elimination of
the ideal elements or the epsilon formulas by a ﬁnite process in polyno-
mial arithmetic, that is Hilbert’s use of inﬁnite descent (die Methode der
Zuru¨ckfu¨hrung) (see Gauthier [2011]) which reduces transﬁnite expressions
to arithmetical statements.
Intuitionistic logic, after the work of Brouwer, Kolmogorov, Heyting
and Go¨del, fares better in discriminating between the ﬁnite and the inﬁ-
nite, simply by rejecting the entension of classical logical laws beyond the
ﬁnite domain and by exploring the potential inﬁnite. This explains why it
is the starting point of the functional interpretation privileged by applied
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proof-theorists; in their hands, intuitionistic logic is extended by various
non-constructive principles or one-way translations from intuitionistic logic
to classical logic. There is the foundational shift from Hilbert’s programme
and it has proven successful in recent proof-theoretic research with Kohlen-
bach [2008] and others.
If applied proof theory and the proof mining enterprise represent a shift
of emphasis in original (pure!) proof theory as Kohlenbach repeats after
Kreisel, it remains that the idea of extracting more constructive informa-
tion (with an enrichment of data) from a given classical proof concurs with
the idea of certainty (Sicherheit) or of certiﬁcation (Sicherung) that Hilbert
deﬁned as the ideal goal of his proof theory and the motto of applied proof
theory could very well be “More information, more certainty”. Detracting
from that ideal would mean fruitless prospection for proof-theorists, ei-
ther in the abstract realm of constructivist principles or in the mining ﬁeld
of promising applications. Of course, the motto has to be substantiated
by further foundational research into the historical, logico-mathematical
and philosophical motives of proof theory. Hilbert was certainly the ﬁrst
mathematician to think of mathematical proofs in terms of a systematic
study of the internal logic of deductive reasoning “das inhaltliche logis-
che Schliessen” in line with Kronecker’s constructive stance in his general
arithmetic “allgemeine Arithmetik” for which he claimed “innere Wahrheit
und Folgerichtigkeit”, that is internal truth and consistency ; these objec-
tives could very well be shared by applied proof theory in the search for
eﬀective proofs in classical analysis where proofs were made available by
the (constructive and non-constructive) means at hand. Proof theory puts
the emphasis on proofs with the aim of making manifest their construc-
tive hidden content and I would count such an enterprise as a revival of
the Kroneckerian spirit with the logical means that Hilbert introduced in
the programme of the arithmetization of logic after the arithmetization of
analysis by Cauchy and Weirstrass along the arithmetization of algebra
by Kronecker. It is maybe in contemporary theoretical computer science,
for example in computational algebraic geometry with the Gro¨bner basis
technique as well as in a variety of computational disciplines, that arith-
metization can be pursued with a ﬁnite number of procedures as I would
translate Hensel’s phrase (eine endliche Anzahl von Versuchen) in the Pref-
ace of Kronecker [1901] to characterize Kronecker’s ﬁnitist arithmetism.
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